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1. Introduction
Two player normal form games (or bi-matrix games) are among the most simple
and popular games. The symmetric games in which the two players do not distinguish
between the different roles of the play have been widely used in evolutionary dynam-
ics, and such dynamics have been extensively studied (Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998; Sandholm, 2010b). Special classes of games such as potential games,
zero-sum games, and stable games have received a great deal of attention because of
their respective analytical advantages. For instance, in potential games, all players’
motivations to choose and deviate from a certain strategy are described by a single
function, called a potential function (Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
The conditions under which a game belongs to these classes have been examined by
several researchers (Hofbauer, 1985; Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Ui, 2000; Hofbauer
and Sandholm, 2009; Sandholm, 2010a). For example Monderer and Shapley (1996)
and Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) provide four-cycle criteria for potential games and
zero-sum games (See Theorem 11.2.2 and Exercise 11.2.9 in Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998). Unlike existing approaches, our focus here is to examine the extent to which
a given game fails to be a potential game or a zero-sum game.
Our basic insight is to view the set of all games as a vector space endowed with
its scalar product. Natural classes of games form subspaces of this vector space and
we systematically analyze these subspaces and their orthogonal complements. At
the very basic level it provides an immediate intuition about the games and their
dynamics. A game which consists of a potential game plus a small non-potential part
is expected, generically, by stability to exhibit a dynamic close to the gradient-like
dynamic of a potential game. On the contrary a game with a large non-potential
part will be rather close to a volume-preserving dynamics with cycling behavior. In
addition our decomposition will clarify the relationship between potential and zero-
sum games by analyzing completely the class of games which are both potential and
zero-sum.
We develop three decomposition methods of bi-matrix games. In the first de-
composition, we consider the subspace of potential games and its orthogonal com-
plement which we call “anti-potential” games (see Figure 1). Maybe surprisingly,
anti-potential games are entirely described in terms of either the Rock-Paper-Scissors
games in the case of symmetric games, and the Matching Pennies games in the case
of bi-matrix games. In the space of symmetric games with three strategies, the only
1
Figure 1: Decomposition Diagram.
Figure 2: Decomposition of Games and Representations. The upper panel shows the de-
composition of a symmetric game into the two extended Rock-paper-scissors games. In the first
extended Rock-paper-scissors game, strategy 4 is “null”, while in the second one strategy 2 is null.
The lower panel shows the representation of these games.
anti-potential game is the Rock-Paper-Scissors games, up to a constant multiple. For
symmetric games with more than three strategies, the extended Rock-Paper-Scissors
game, which involves three strategies as Rock, Paper, and Scissors, forms a basis for
the anti-potential games (see the upper panels of Figure 2). Similarly, (extended)
Matching Pennies games provide a basis for bi-matrix anti-potential games.
In our second decomposition we start with the subspace of zero-sum games (see
Figure 1 again) and find that the orthogonal complement is a special subspace of the
potential game subspace (potential games for which the sums of rows are all zero).
This class of potential games plays an important role in understanding the structures
of stable games.
Finally to understand the relationship between these two decompositions and
hence potential games and zero-sum games we use the projection mapping P onto
the tangent space of the simplex (See Sandholm, 2010b; Hofbauer and Sandholm,
2009). We derive a third decomposition of the space of all games by considering the
mapping Γ(A) = PAP for any matrix A. The kernel of this mapping turn out to
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consist of games which are both zero-sum and potential games (See Figure 1). We
also show that the kernel coincides with the set of all games with dominant strategies.
Thus, the simplest dynamics, namely the one induced by the Prisoner’s Dilemma, is
the only possible type of the dynamics that games belonging to both potential and
zero-sum spaces can exhibit. In addition, we show that the subspace of all potential
games has an orthogonal decomposition into the subspace of all anti-zero-sum games
and the kernel of the mapping Γ. Similarly, the subspace of all zero-sum games is the
direct sum of the subspace of anti-potential games and the kernel of Γ (See Figure
1). This implies that the space of two player games can be uniquely decomposed
into three orthogonal subspaces: the subspaces of anti-potential games, of anti-zero-
sum games, and of the kernel of Γ. The map Γ has been used in the recent work
Sandholm (2010a) on the decomposition of normal form games: our decomposition
implies that the range of Γ can be further decomposed into two nice classes of games;
the anti-potential games and anti-zero-sum games.
We illustrate the effectiveness of these decompositions by considering several ap-
plications:
Algorithmic methods of identifying potential and zero-sum games: The
decompositions provide algorithmic methods to test whether a game is a potential
game, a zero-sum game, or both. Providing explicit bases for subspaces of games
allows an easy numerical implementation even for a large number of strategies.
Representation of games: The decompositions allow to understand easily the
structure of well known games such as the generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors game,
universally cycling games (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, p.98). In particular, the
simple anti-potential games have a graphical representation using the orthonormal
basis of games (See the lower panels of Figure 2).
Stable games: We provide a complete characterization of the null-stable games;
every null stable game is a zero-sum game. The converse of the statement is obvious
from the definition; using the decomposition we show that there is no null stable
game which is not a zero-sum game, a non-trivial claim. Since there are games that
are both potential and zero-sum, this shows that some potential games are null-
stable. In addition, because every bi-matrix stable game is null stable (Hofbauer and
Sandholm, 2009), this provides a complete characterization of two-player asymmetric
stable games. We also present an explicit class of strict stable games using the
decompositions.
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Dynamics: The decompositions are useful to analyze the evolutionary dynamics of
the underlying game. (a) Lyapunov functions arise naturally from the perspective
of decompositions. (b) Our decomposition yields the Hodge decomposition for the
vector field of the replicator dynamics, i.e. the decomposition into a gradient-like
part (anti-zero-sum), a monotonic part (kernel of Γ), and a circulation part (anti-
potential) (See Abraham et al. (1988) and equation (1) in Tong et al. (2003)). (c) We
construct games with special properties: for example we will explain how to construct
Zeeman games, namely games with an interior attracting fixed point and a strict pure
NE (hence an ESS) and we provide such an example for four strategy games.
These decompositions turn out to be extremely useful also for the stochastic up-
dating mechanism of games with finite populations. These applications will be studied
elsewhere.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present the three decompo-
sitions of the bi-matrix games and of the symmetric games, give several examples
and discuss also the decomposition of n−player normal form games. In Section 3
we characterize stable games using the decompositions, explain the implications of
the decompositions on the dynamics, and provide a four-strategy Zeeman game. We
provide in the main text some proofs that are important in the expositions of the
paper; tedious and book-keeping proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Decompositions of the Space of Games into Orthogonal Subspaces
2.1. Potential games and zero-sum games decompositions
To illustrate the idea of our first decomposition, we decompose the well-known
generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors game by performing a simple calculation. γ1 −a+ γ2 b+ γ3b+ γ1 0 + γ2 −a+ γ3
−a+ γ1 b+ γ2 γ3
 (1)
=
γ1 γ2 γ3γ1 γ2 γ3
γ1 γ2 γ3

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Passive Game
+
1
2
(b− a)
0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Potential Part
+
1
2
(b+ a)
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Anti-potential Part
(2)
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It is easy to see that the game (1) is a potential game if and only if a = −b and is
equivalent to the Rock-paper-scissors game if and only if a = b. In this section we
show that such a decomposition as in (2) holds for any game.
We start with symmetric games: let us denote the space of all l × l matrices by
L, and let us endow L with the inner product 〈A,B〉L = tr(ATB). A passive game
(in the terminology of Sandholm (2010b)) is a game in which players’ payoffs do not
depend on the choice of strategies. Let E
(j)
γ ∈ L be the matrix given by
E(j)γ (k, l) =
{
1 if k = j
0 otherwise
;
i.e., E
(j)
γ is a matrix which has 1’s in its jth column and 0’s at all other entries.
Then the set of all symmetric passive games is given by I := span{E(i)γ }j. It is well-
known that the set of Nash equilibria for a symmetric game is left invariant under
the addition of a passive game to the payoff matrix.
To characterize the spaces of all potential games and all zero-sum games, we define
the following special matrices:
K(ij) =
i-th j-th
i-th → -1 · · · 1
...
...
j-th → 1 · · · -1
, N (ij) =
1st i-th j-th
1st 0 · · · -1 · · · 1
...
...
...
i-th → 1 · · · 0 · · · -1
...
...
...
j-th → -1 · · · 1 · · · 0
,
where all other elements in the matrices are zeros. Note that N (ij) is a game whose
restriction on the strategy set {1, i, j} × {1, i, j} is the Rock-Paper-Scissors game.
Monderer and Shapley (1996)
Recall that a symmetric game A is a potential game (Monderer and Shapley
(1996)) if there exist a symmetric matrix S and a passive game
∑
j γjE
(j)
γ ∈ I such
that
A = S +
∑
j
γjE
(j)
γ . (3)
We will use the word “exact ” to indicate that a game is a potential game with no
passive part, i.e., all γj = 0 (exact potential games are called full potential games
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in Sandholm (2010b)). We denote by M the linear subspace of all potential games
and we have the orthogonal decomposition L =M⊕M⊥ with respect to the inner
product <,>L. We call a game in M⊥ an anti-potential game.
Note that the dimension of the subspace of L consisting of all symmetric matrices
is 1
2
l(l + 1) and the dimension of the subspace of passive games is l. Since the sum
of all Eγ is an exact potential game, namely the game whose payoffs are all 1’s, the
dimension of the intersection between the subspace of all symmetric matrices and I is
at least 1. Conversely if a matrix belongs to this intersection, then the entries of this
matrices should be all the same (see also the discussion in Sandholm (2010a, p.15))
and so the dimension of the intersection is exactly 1. Hence the dimension of M is
given by
dim(M) = l(l + 1)
2
+ l − 1 = l2 − (l − 1)(l − 2)
2
. (4)
Note that the extended Rock-Paper-Scissors game, N (ij), is an anti-symmetric matrix
whose column sums and row sums are all 0’s. Thus, we have
〈
A,N (ij)
〉
L = 0 ,
for all A ∈M, because 〈S,N (ij)〉L = 0 and 〈P,N (ij)〉L = 0 for all symmetric matrix
S and all passive game P (See the appendix for the properties of 〈〉L). In other
words, N (ij) ∈ M⊥ for all i, j. The set {N (ij) : j > i, i = 2, · · · , l − 1} has (l−1)(l−2)
2
elements and they are linearly independent since each N (ij) is uniquely determined
by the property of having 1 in its (i, j) th position. This set forms a basis for M⊥.
If a matrix B is antisymmetric and the sums of elements in each column in B are
all zeros, 〈S,B〉L = 0 for a symmetric matrix and 〈P,B〉L = 0 for a passive game P.
Therefore B ∈ M⊥. On the other hand, if B ∈ M⊥, B can be written as a linear
combination of N (ij), and hence B is antisymmetric and the sums of elements in each
column in B are all zeros. Thus we obtain
Proposition 2.1 (Anti-potential games). We have
B ∈M⊥ if and only if BT = −B and
∑
j
B(i, j) =
∑
i
B(i, j) = 0 .
Moreover the set {N (ij) : j > i, i = 2, · · · , l} forms a basis for M⊥.
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Proposition 2.1 shows that a basis for M⊥ can be obtained from the extended
Rock-Paper-Scissors. As a corollary of Proposition 2.1 we obtain immediately the
criterion for potential games given by Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998).
Corollary 2.2 (Potential games). A is a potential game if and only if
a(l,m)− a(k,m) + a(k, l)− a(m, l) + a(m, k)− a(l, k) = 0 for all l,m, k ∈ S (5)
Proof. First note from Proposition 2.1 that A is a potential game if and only if〈
A,N (ij)
〉
L = 0 for all i, j. Then note that
a(l,m)− a(k,m) + a(k, l)− a(m, l) + a(m, k)− a(l, k) = 〈A,E〉L
where
E =
k l m
k 0 1 -1
l -1 0 1
m 1 -1 0
and all other entries in E are 0’s.
Then clearly (5) implies
〈
A,N (ij)
〉
L = 0 for all i, j. Conversely, the matrix E is anti-
symmetric and its row sums and column sums are zero, so E ∈M⊥. Therefore E can
be uniquely written as N (ij) and thus
〈
A,N (ij)
〉
L = 0 for all i, j implies (5).
We provide next a similar decomposition starting with zero-sum games. We call
an anti-symmetric matrix A an exact zero-sum game and call a game zero-sum if it
can be written as the sum of a antisymmetric matrix and a passive game. Let us
denote by N the subspace of all zero-sum games. The dimension of the subspace
all anti-symmetric matrices is (l−1)l
2
and the dimension of the intersection between
the subspace of anti-symmetric matrices and I is 0 (the diagonal elements of anti-
symmetric matrices are all zeros and hence all off-diagonal elements are again all zeros
if this game is also a passive game). Thus
dim(N ) = (l − 1)l
2
+ l = l2 − (l − 1)l
2
. (6)
We decompose the space of game as L = N ⊕ N⊥ and we call a game in N⊥ an
anti-zero-sum game. Note that K(ij) is a symmetric matrix whose row sums and
column sums are zeros, so K(ij) ∈ N⊥. The set {K(ij) : j > i, i = 1, · · · , l} has (l−1)l
2
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elements which are linearly independent since each K(ij) is uniquely determined by
having 1 in its (i, j)th entry. Thus we obtain
Proposition 2.3 (Anti-zero-sum games). We have
B ∈ N⊥ if and only if BT = B and
∑
j
B(i, j) =
∑
i
B(i, j) = 0 .
Moreover the set {K(ij) : j > i, i = 1, · · · , l − 1} forms a basis for N⊥.
Using this orthogonal decomposition we obtain a new criterion to identify a zero-
sum game similar to the criterion in Corollary 2.2.
Corollary 2.4 (Zero-sum games). A is a zero-sum game if and only if
a(j, i)− a(i, i) + a(i, j)− a(j, j) = 0 for all i, j ∈ S . (7)
Proof. If A ∈ N then 〈A,K(ij)〉L = 0 which yields (7).
2.2. Decomposition using the projection mapping Γ
The subspaces of potential games and zero-sum games have a non-trivial intersec-
tionM∩N . In order to understand this set let P = I− 1
l
11T where I is the identity
matrix and 1 the constant vector with entries equal to 1. It is easy to see that P is
the orthogonal projection onto the subspace T∆ = {x ∈ Rl ;∑i xi = 0}, i.e., onto the
tangent space to the unit simplex ∆ = {x ∈ Rl ;xi ≥ 0 ,
∑
i xi = 1}. Let us define a
linear transformation Γ on L by
Γ : L → L, A 7→ PAP.
To characterize the kernel and the range of the map Γ, let us say that a game is a
constant game if the player’s payoff does not depend on his opponent’s strategy, that
is the payoff matrix is constant on each row. The matrices E
(i)
η := (E
(i)
γ )T form an
orthonormal basis of the subspace of constant games. Note that E
(i)
η has a strictly
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dominant strategy. Furthermore let us define
E(ij)κ =
j−th j + 1−th
...
...
i−th · · · -1 1 · · ·
i+ 1−th · · · 1 -1 · · ·
...
...
where all other entries are 0’s.
It is easy to see that
span{E(1)η , · · · , E(l)η , E(1)γ , · · · , E(l)γ } ⊂ ker Γ. (8)
Conversely, one can show that the left and right actions of the projection matrices
makes only this class belongs to ker Γ. Then note that∑
i
E(l)γ =
∑
i
E(l)η ,
so by throwing away one element from the spanning set (8), we may obtain the
independent spanning set, hence a basis for the kernel of Γ. Concerning the range of Γ,
by counting the basis elements, we have dim(ker Γ) = 2l−1 and, thus, dim(rangeΓ) =
l2 − (2l − 1) = (l − 1)2. Since 1E(ij)κ = 0 and E(ij)κ 1 = 0,
{E(ij)κ : i = 1, · · · , l − 1, j = 1, · · · l − 1}
provides a natural candidate for the basis of the range. These observations lead to
Proposition 2.5 whose formal proof is elementary but tedious, and hence relegated to
the Appendix.
Proposition 2.5 (Characterizations of ker(Γ) and range(Γ)). We have
(1) {E(i)η }i 6=1 ∪ {E(j)γ }j form a basis for ker Γ.
(2) {E(ij)κ : i = 1, · · · , l − 1, j = 1, · · · l − 1} form a basis for range(Γ).
Next, we study the relationship among these subspaces. First every game in the
subspace N⊥ is a symmetric matrix and thus a potential game. Similarly every
anti-potential game is a zero-sum game, so we have N⊥ ⊂ M and M⊥ ⊂ N . To
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understand the relationship among these spaces further, note the following facts:1 1 10 0 0
0 0 0
+
1 0 01 0 0
1 0 0
 =
2 1 11 0 0
1 0 0

1 1 10 0 0
0 0 0
−
1 0 01 0 0
1 0 0
 =
 0 1 1−1 0 0
−1 0 0
 .
This example illustrates the fact that any game in ker(Γ) which is not a passive game
is both a potential game and zero-sum game; i.e., every constant game is both a
potential games and zero-sum games. As Proposition 2.6 shows the converse holds:
a game which is both a potential and a zero-sum game is equivalent to a constant
game.
Proposition 2.6. ker(Γ) =M ∩ N and range(Γ) =M⊥ ⊕N⊥.
Proposition 2.6 provides the essential characterization of the relationship among
spaces. Since L = ker(Γ) ⊕ range(Γ), from Proposition 2.6, we obtain the de-
composition of a given game into three parts; L =M⊥ ⊕ N⊥ ⊕ ker(Γ). Also since
N ∩ (M⊥∪N⊥) =M⊥, we will have N∩ range(Γ) =M⊥ and this provides another
characterization of M⊥ as follows. From Proposition 2.1, we know that a game is
anti-potential if and only if it is an antisymmetric matrix whose row sums and column
sums are zeros. We know that all row sums and column sums of games belonging to
range(Γ) are zeros and the zero sum game is the sum of an antisymmetric matrix and
a passive game; thus we can show that M⊥ = N∩ range(Γ). In this way we obtain
the following key result in the paper.
Theorem 2.7. We have
(1) M = N⊥ ⊕ ker(Γ) and M⊥ = N∩ range(Γ)
(2) N =M⊥ ⊕ ker(Γ) and N⊥ =M∩ range(Γ)
(3) L =M⊥ ⊕N⊥ ⊕ ker(Γ)
Proof. (1) From Proposition 2.6, we have N⊥ + ker(Γ) = span(N⊥ ∪ ker(Γ)) =
span((N⊥ ∪M)∩ (N⊥ ∪N )) =M. Since N⊥ ⊥ ker(Γ), we haveM = N⊥⊕ ker(Γ).
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From proposition 2.6, we haveM⊥ ⊂M⊥⊕N⊥ = range(Γ) and see thatM⊥ ⊂ N∩
range(Γ). Conversely again from proposition 2.6, we have
N ∩ range(Γ) = N ∩ (span(M⊥ ∪N⊥)) ⊃ span(N∩(M⊥ ∪N⊥)) =M⊥.
By changing the roles of M and N , we obtain (2). (3) follows from L =M⊥ ⊕
M =M⊥ ⊕N⊥ ⊕ ker(Γ).
Sandholm (2010a) provides a method of decomposing normal form games by using
the orthogonal projection P : for a given A write
A = PAP︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ range(Γ)
+ (I − P )AP + PA(I − P ) + (I − P )A(I − P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ ker(Γ)
. (9)
The first term in (9) belongs to the range of Γ and the remaining three terms belong
to the kernel of Γ. Our decompositions (Proposition 2.6) show that PAP can be
further decomposed into games having nice properties − potential games and zero-
sum games − and every game in ker(Γ) is a game which is both a potential and a
zero-sum game and possesses (generically) a dominant strategy.
Theorem 2.7 also provides a convenient way to compute the anti-zero-sum part
(anti-potential part, resp.) of a game when the anti-potential part (anti-zero-sum
part, resp.) is known. Suppose that A is a symmetric game and its anti-potential
part is Z. Then the part of A that belongs to ker(Γ) is A − PAP . Hence from (3)
of Theorem 2.7, its anti-zero-sum part is given by A− Z − (A− PAP ) = PAP−Z;
in fact Theorem 2.7 shows that PAP−Z is a symmetric matrix in L and its all row
sums and column sums are zeros.
2.3. Decompositions of bi-matrix games
In this section we prove a decomposition theorem for bi-matrix games and elu-
cidate the relations between the decomposition of symmetric and bi-matrix games.
Most results in this section generalize the corresponding results in sections 2.1-2.2.
We denote (with a slight abuse of notation) by L the space of all lr× lc matrices with
the inner product 〈A,B〉L := tr(ATB). The set of all bi-matrix games is L2 := L × L
and sometimes we will view a bi-matrix game (A,B) as a (lr + lc)× (lr + lc) matrix
given by
(A,B) :=
(
Or A
BT Oc
)
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where Or and Oc are lr × lr and lc× lc zero matrices, respectively. The space L2 is a
linear subspace of the set of all (lr+lc)×(lr+lc) matrices of dimension 2lrlc. We endow
L2 with the inner product < ·, · >L2 , where 〈(A,B), (C,D)〉L2 := tr((A,B)T (C,D)).
The elementary properties of this scalar product are summarized in the Appendix.
The set of all bi-matrix passive games I¯ is given by
I¯ := span({(E(j)γ , O)}j ∪ {(O,E(i)γ )}i).
and we say that the games (A,B) and(C,D) are equivalent if (A,B)− (C,D) ∈ I¯. In
this case we write (A,B) ∼ (C,D). The set of Nash equilibria for a bi-matrix game
is invariant under this equivalence relation.
Note that (E
(ij)
κ ,−E(ij)κ ) is a game whose restriction on the strategy set {i, i +
1} × {j, j + 1} is the Matching Pennies game and we call it an extended Matching
Pennies game.
From Monderer and Shapley (1996) we recall that (A,B) is a potential game if
there exist a matrix S and {γj}j , {ηi}i such that
(A,B) = (S, S) +
∑
j
γj(E
(j)
γ , O) +
∑
i
ηi(O,E
(i)
η ) .
Denoting by M¯ the subspace of all potential games, we have the orthogonal decom-
position L2 = M¯⊕M¯⊥. The dimension of the subspace of all exact potential games
is lr × lc and the dimension of the subspace of all passive games is lr + lc. Arguing as
for symmetric games, one finds that the dimension of M¯ is given by
dim(M¯) = lrlc + lr + lc − 1 = 2lrlc − (lr − 1)(lc − 1). (10)
Note also that (Eκ
(ij),−Eκ(ij)) is an anti-symmetric matrix as an element in L2 whose
column sum and row sum are all 0’s, thus we have
〈
(A,B), (Eκ
(i,j),−Eκ(i,j))
〉
L2 = 0
for all (A,B) ∈ M¯. In other words, (Eκ(ij),−Eκ(ij)) ∈ M¯⊥ for all i, j and the number
of such (Eκ
(i,j),−Eκ(i,j)) is (lr − 1)(lc − 1). Hence we have
Proposition 2.8 (Anti-potential games). The set {(Eκ(i,j),−Eκ(i,j))}1≤i<lr,1≤j<lc
is a basis for M¯⊥.
Proof. From the discussion above, it is enough to show the linear independence
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among (E
(ij)
κ ,−E(ij)κ ). To do this, we consider the following linear combination:∑
i,j
κ(ij)E(ij)κ = 0.
Then, it is easy to see that κ(11) = 0. This implies κ(1,j) = 0 for all j which, in turn,
implies κ(i,j) = 0 for all i.
Proposition 2.8 shows that a basis for M⊥ can be obtained from the Matching
Pennies games and its extensions. From this, we say that (A,B) is an bi-matrix
anti-potential game whenever (A,B) ∈ M⊥. Proposition 2.8 provides an alternative
and simple proof for the well-known criterion for the potential game by Monderer
and Shapley (1996):
Corollary 2.9 (Potential games). (A,B) is a potential game if and only if for all
i, i′ ∈ Sr, j, j′ ∈ Sc,
a(i′, j)− a(i, j) + b(i′, j′)− b(i′, j) + a(i, j′)− a(i′, j′) + b(i, j)− b(i, j′) = 0
Proof. It is enough to notice that
a(i′, j)− a(i, j) + b(i′, j′)− b(i′, j) + a(i, j′)− a(i′, j′) + b(i, j)− b(i, j′)
=
〈
(A,B), (K(i,i
′)(j,j′),−K(i,i′)(j,j′))
〉
L2
where (K(i,i
′)(j,j′),−K(i,i′)(j,j′)) is an extended Matching Pennies game whose restric-
tion on {i, i′} × {j, j′} is a Matching Pennies game.
Next we consider a decomposition using zero-sum games as in Section 2.2. We
call a game of the form (A,−A) an exact zero-sum game and say that a game is
a zero-sum game if it can be written as the sum of an exact zero-sum game and a
passive game. We denote by N¯ the subspace of all bi-matrix zero-sum games and
have dim(N¯ ) = 2lrlc − (lr − 1)(lc − 1). A similar argument as in Section 2.2 yields
Proposition 2.10 (Anti-zero-sum games). The set {(E(ij)κ , E(ij)κ )}1≤i<lr,1≤j<lc is
a basis for N¯⊥.
Again the following corollary is an immediate consequence of orthogonality (See
Exercise 11.2.9 in Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998).
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Corollary 2.11 (Zero-sum games). (A,B) is a zero-sum game if and only if for
all i, i′ ∈ Sr, j, j′ ∈ Sc,
a(i′, j)− a(i, j)− b(i′, j′) + b(i′, j) + a(i, j′)− a(i′, j′)− b(i, j) + b(i, j′) = 0.
Finally to consider the decomposition in terms of the projection mapping onto
the tangent space as in Section 2.3, we modify the definition of Γ :
Γ : L → L, A 7→ PrAPc, Plr = Ir −
1
lr
1r1
T
r , Pc = Ic −
1
lc
1c1
T
c .
and define Γ : L2→ L2 by
(A,B) 7→ P(A,B)P : =
(
Pr O
O Pc
)(
O A
BT O
)(
Pr O
O Pc
)
.
As in symmetric games (Proposition 2.5), we obtain the following characterizations
for ker(Γ) and range (Γ):
Proposition 2.12. We have
ker(Γ) = span
({(E(i)η , O)}i 6=1 ∪ {(E(i)γ , O)}i ∪ {(O,E(i)η )}i ∪ {(O,E(i)γ )}i 6=1)
range(Γ) = span
({(E(ij)κ , O)}i≥1,j≥1 ∪ {O,E(ij)κ }i≥1,j≥1)
Clearly results similar to Proposition 2.6, and Theorem 2.7 hold for L2 and the
subspaces M¯, M¯⊥, N¯ , N¯⊥, ker(Γ), and range(Γ). To understand the relationship
between the decompositions of symmetric games and bi-matrix games, note that the
set of two player symmetric games corresponds to the set of all bi-matrix games with
l = lr = lc satisfying A = B
T . Thus in this case,
(A,B) is a symmetric game if A = BT .
To avoid confusion, we denote by Lsym the set of all symmetric games as a subspace
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of L2 and write [A] = (A,AT ). Consider the following example:
[E(12)κ − E(21)κ ] = (E(12)κ ,−E(12)κ )− (E(21)κ ,−E(21)κ )
=
0,0 -1,1 1,-1
0,0 1,-1 -1,1
0,0 0,0 0,0
−
0,0 0,0 0,0
-1,1 1,-1 0,0
1,-1 -1,1 0,0
=
0,0 -1,1 1,-1
1,-1 0,0 -1,1
-1,1 1,-1 0,0
.
Thus [E
(12)
κ −E(21)κ ] is the Rock-Paper-Scissors game; this example shows how one can
“symmetrize” the bi-matrix games to obtain the symmetric version of them. More
generally, we obtain the orthonormal bases of anti-potential games and anti-zero-
sum symmetric games in symmetric games by restricting the bases of subspaces of
bi-matrix games using the following lemma.
Lemma 2.13. Suppose that {(A(ij), A(ij))}i,j∈I1∪{(B(ij),−B(ij))}i,j∈I2∪{(C(i), O)}i∈I3∪
{(O, (C(i))T )}i∈I3 form a basis for K, a subspace of L2 and {A(ij)}i,j ∪ {B(ij)}i,j ∪
{C(i)}i are linearly independent. Then {[A(ij)+A(ji)]}i,j∈I1∩{j≥i}∪{[B(ij)−B(ji)]}i,j∈I2∩{j>i}∪
{[C(i)]}i∈I3 form a basis for K ∩ Lsym.
As an immediate consequence of the decomposition we obtain the alternative proof
for the following well-known characterization for potential and zero-sum games (Hof-
bauer and Sigmund, 1998; Sandholm, 2010b). Notice that a similar characterization
for the symmetric potential and zero-sum games is also readily available.
Proposition 2.14. The following conditions are equivalent:
(1) (A,B) is a potential game (a zero-sum game, respectively)
(2) P(A,B)P is a symmetric (lr + lc)× (lr + lc) matrix (an antisymmetric (lr + lc)×
(lr + lc) matrix, respectively)
(3) (A,B)− (A,B)T ∈ ker(Γ) ((A,B) + (A,B)T ∈ ker(Γ), respectively.)
Proof. For a given (A,B), using range(Γ) =M⊥ ⊕N⊥ (Proposition 2.6) we have
P(A,B)P = (V, V ) + (N,−N) for some V and N ∈ L.
Since (V, V ) is a (lr+lc)×(lr+lc) symmetric matrix and (N,−N) is a (lr+lc)×(lr+lc)
anti-symmetric, so (1) ⇔ (2). For (2) ⇔ (3), we first note that (A,B)T = (B,A).
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Thus (A± B,B ± A) ∈ ker(Γ), if and only if P(A± B,B ± A)P = O, if and only if
P(A,B)P = ±P(B,A)P, if and only if P(A,B)P = ±(P(A,B)P)T .
2.4. Decompositions of n-player normal form games.
In this section we will briefly discuss how to generalize the decomposition to the
case of n−player normal form games. We provide more detailed discussion in the
Appendix. For the simplicity of exposition, we suppose that all n−players have the
same strategy set S. We denote by Ln the set of all n player games, by S the set
of all strategy profiles and by P the set of all players. First note that we have
dim(Ln) = nln. We use a ln dimensional tensor A to denote a player’s payoffs and
thus a normal form game is given by (Ap1 , Ap2 , · · · , Apn) for pl ∈ P . We introduce an
inner product 〈〉Ln in Ln :
〈(Ap1 , · · · , Apn), (Bp1 , · · · , Bpn)〉Ln =
∑
i=1,···n
〈Api , Bpi〉L ,
where
〈A,B〉L =
∑
(ip1 ,··· ,ipn )∈S
aip1 ,··· ,ipn bip1 ,··· ,ipn .
Similarly we denote byMn the subspace of all potential games. We have the following
recursive formula for the dimension of Mn.
Proposition 2.15. We have dim(Mn+1)⊥ = (l − 1)2nln−1 + dim(Mn)⊥.
Proof. First note that dim(Mn) = ln − 1 + nln−1. and thus
dim(Mn+1)⊥ = (n+ 1)ln+1 − ln+1 − (n+ 1)ln + 1
= (l − 1)2(nln−1 + (n− 1)ln−2 + · · ·+ 2l + 1)
= (l − 1)2nln−1 + dim(Mn)⊥.
The recursive relation in Proposition 2.15 shows that a basis for (Mn+1)⊥ can be
obtained from the existing basis of (Mn)⊥ by adding (l−1)2nln−1 additional elements.
To illustrate this, we consider two strategy three player games. From
M2 = span( -1,1 1,-1
1,-1 -1,1
),
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Figure 3: A basis for three-player anti-potential games. Each vertex in each cube represents
the strategy profile and the arrows show the deviation motivations based on the payoffs from the
game.
we expand this basis bi-matrix to obtain an element of the basis set forM3 by making
player 3 as a null player (See the first cubic in Figure 3) . That is,
M1 =
-1,1,0 1,-1,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
1,-1,0 -1,1,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
.
Now we imagine that one of existing players, player 1 and player 2, is matched with
player 3 to play the Matching Pennies game. Then since the null player, either player
1 or player 2, can choose one strategy from the two strategies, there are four possible
situations in which two players play the Matching Pennies game and one player plays
the null player (See Figure 3). Thus we obtain the following basis games.
M2 =
-1,0,1 0,0,0 1,0,-1 0,0,0
1,0,-1 0,0,0 -1,0,1 0,0,0
, M3 =
0,0,0 -1,0,1 0,0,0 1,0,-1
0,0,0 1,0,-1 0,0,0 -1,0,1
M4 =
0,-1,1 0,1,-1 0,1,-1 0,-1,1
0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
, M5 =
0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
0,-1,1 0,1,-1 0,1,-1 0,-1,1
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It is easy to see that M1, · · · ,M5 are independent and belong to M3. Thus
{M1, · · · ,M5} form a basis for M3. Here we verify Proposition 2.15 as follows:
dim(M3)⊥ = (2− 1)22× 22−1 + dim(M2)⊥.
Note that
M6 =
0,0,0 0,0,0 -1,1,0 1,-1,0
0,0,0 0,0,0 1,-1,0 -1,1,0
can be obtained by taking M1 − (M2 −M3 −M4 + M5). Next we characterize the
subspace of all zero-sum games. We call a game (Ap1 , Ap2 , · · · , Apn) is an exact zero-
sum game if
(Ap1)(ip1 ,··· ,ipn ) + · · ·+ (Apn)(ip1 ,··· ,ipn ) = 0 for all (ip1 , · · · , ipn) ∈ S.
The following lemma reveals the structure of the subspace of all zero-sum games.
Lemma 2.16. A = (Ap1 , Ap2 , · · · , Apn) is an exact zero-sum game if and only if A
can be written as a finite sum of tensors Z’s of the form:
Z = (O, · · · , O, Zpi , O, · · · , O,−Zpi , O, · · · ).
Proof. “If part” is trivial. For “only if part”, we decompose A first into ln tensors
whose (ip1 , · · · , ipn)th element is the same as ((Ap1)(ip1 ,··· ,ipn ), · · · , (Apn)(ip1 ,··· ,ipn )) and
other elements are all 0’s. Then since ((Ap1)(ip1 ,··· ,ipn ), · · · , (Apn)(ip1 ,··· ,ipn )) ∈ T∆n
and {(1,−1, 0, · · · , 0), (1, 0,−1, · · · , 0), · · · , (1, 0, 0, · · · ,−1)} form a basis for T∆n,
we have the desired representation.
Then we can define the subspace of zero-sum games and obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 2.17. We have dim(N⊥) = (l − 1)p
From this discussion, we obtain the decompositions of potential games and anti-
potential games and the decompositions of zero-sum games and anti-zero-sum games
as in Section 2.1-2.3.
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Figure 4: Representation of the Rock-paper-scissors games
2.5. Examples of Decompositions
Because of the simple structure of basis games in the subspace of anti-potential
games we can associate a class of anti-potential games with a set of graphs. To explain
this we focus on symmetric games. First observe that all basis elements inM⊥, N (ij)
have payoffs consisting 0, 1, and −1. Thus we can assign a binary relation to (i, j):
for given A, i  j if a(i, j) = 1 (i is better than j), i ≺ j if a(i, j) = −1 (i is worse
than j), and i ∼ j if a(i, j) = 0 (i is as good as j). Since every anti-potential game is
anti-symmetric, the relation is symmetric; i.e., i  j if and only if j ≺ i . Therefore
we can represent a given basis element of anti-potential games in a diagram as in
Figure 4.
For games with cyclic symmetry (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, p.173) we have
the following decomposition.

0 a1 a2 a3 a4
a4 0 a1 a2 a3
a3 a4 0 a1 a2
a2 a3 a4 0 a1
a1 a2 a3 a4 0
 ∼ 1
2

0 a1 + a4 a2 + a3 a2 + a3 a1 + a4
a1 + a4 0 a1 + a4 a2 + a3 a2 + a3
a2 + a3 a1 + a4 0 a1 + a4 a2 + a3
a2 + a3 a2 + a3 a1 + a4 0 a1 + a4
a1 + a4 a2 + a3 a2 + a3 a1 + a4 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
+
1
2

0 a1 − a4 a2 − a3 −a2 + a3 −a1 + a4−a1 + a4 0 a1 − a4 a2 − a3 −a2 + a3−a2 + a3 −a1 + a4 0 a1 − a4 a2 − a3
a2 − a3 −a2 + a3 −a1 + a4 0 a1 − a4
a1 − a4 a2 − a3 −a2 + a3 −a1 + a4 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
M⊥
If a1 − a4 = a2 − a3 − 1, then the anti-potential part of game can be represented in
Figure 5.
In case of two-strategy bi-matrix coordination games, we have the following de-
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Figure 5: Games with cyclic symmetry.
composition of a two-strategy.
a, b 0, 0
0, 0 c, d
∼ 1
2
0, 0 0,−b+ d
−a+ c, 0 −a+ c,−b+ d︸ ︷︷ ︸
ker(Γ)
+
1
8
(a+ b+ c+ d)
1, 1 −1,−1
−1,−1 1, 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N¯⊥
+
1
8
(−a+ b− c+ d) −1, 1 1,−1
1,−1 −1, 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
M¯⊥
Therefore, a two-strategy coordination game is a potential game if and only if −a +
b − c + d = 0 and a zero-sum game if and only if a + b + c + d = 0. In other words,
the coefficients of the anti-potential game and the anti-zero-sum game corresponds to
the condition for payoffs in four-cycle criteria as in Corollary 2.9 and 2.11.
3. Applications of Decompositions
3.1. Decompositions and Stable Games
In this section, we provide a characterization of stable games (for properties of
stable games see Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2009). A symmetric game [A] is a stable
game if 〈y − x,A(y − x)〉Rl ≤ 0 for all x, y ∈ ∆l. A bi-matrix game (A,B) is a stable
game if 〈y − x, (A,B)(y − x)〉Rlr+lc ≤ 0 for all x, y ∈ ∆lr ×∆lc . A null-stable game
is a stable for which equality holds instead of an inequality.
Note that since [A] = (A,AT ), the condition for a symmetric game to be stable
can be written as
〈
y − x, (A,AT )(y − x)〉Rl+l ≤ 0 for all x, y ∈ {(p, q) ∈ ∆l ×∆l : p = q} . (11)
By comparing this to the condition for bi-matrix games to be stable (with lr = lc = l)
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we see that the inequality in (11) holds for a smaller subset of R2l. This opens the
possibility that more stable games arise in symmetric games. Using the projection
operator P defined in Section 2 we see that a symmetric game A is a stable game if
and only if 〈x, PAPx〉 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ Rl and a bi-matrix game (A,B) is a stable
game if and only if 〈x,P(A,B)Px〉 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ Rlr+lc (Hofbauer and Sandholm,
2009, Theorem 2.1).
We first characterize stable symmetric matrix games. To do this we define a
function VA for a given symmetric game A, which will play an important role in
characterizing stable games: VA(x) :=
1
2
〈x,Ax〉 . Then using the decomposition, we
obtain the following representation of VA.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that A ∈ L. Then there exists a symmetric matrix S with
S1 = 0 and a column vector a vector c such that, for any x ∈ ∆ and any z ∈ T∆
VA(x) =
1
2
〈x, Sx〉+ 〈x, c〉 , VA(z) = 1
2
〈z, Sz〉 .
Moreover there exists an orthonormal basis {v1, · · · , vl−1} of T∆ (in particular 〈vi,1〉 = 0)
such that S =
∑l−1
i=1 λiSi where Si is the orthogonal projection onto the eigenspace
spanned by vi.
Proof. Let A ∈ L = N⊥ ⊕ ker(Γ)⊕M⊥ and thus we can write
A = S + c11
T + 1cT2 +N
where S is symmetric with S1 = 0 and N is anti-symmetric with N1 = 0. Thus for
any x ∈ Rl we have
VA(x) =
1
2
〈x, Sx〉+ 1
2
〈
x, (c11
T + 1cT2 )x
〉
For x ∈ ∆ we have 〈x, c11Tx〉 = ∑i xi 〈x, c1〉 = 〈x, c1〉 and 〈x,1cT2 x〉 = ∑i xi 〈x, c2〉 =
〈x, c2〉, and thus
1
2
〈
x, (c11
T + 1cT2 )x
〉
= 〈x, c〉 where c = c1 + c2.
Note further that S = PSP and
〈
z, c11
T z
〉
=
〈
z,1cT2 z
〉
= 0 for z ∈ T∆. Since
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S is symmetric, all eigenvectors are orthogonal and since 1 is an eigenvector with
the corresponding eigenvalue λ = 0, all other eigenvectors belong to T∆ and the
representation of S follows from the spectral theorem.
To characterize the stable games using Proposition 3.1, we let A ∈ L and z ∈ T∆.
Then
VA(z) =
1
2
〈z, Sz〉 = 1
2
〈∑
i
ξivi, S
∑
i
ξivi
〉
=
1
2
∑
i
ξ2iλi
where vi is orthonormal basis for T∆ consisting of eigenvectors of S. Thus A is null-
stable iff λi = 0 for all i. Therefore A is a null-stable game if and only if A ∈ N .
We put this fact as Proposition 3.2 of which another direct proof is presented in the
Appendix. Similarly note that VA(z) < 0 for all z 6= 0 if and only if λi < 0 for all i.
Thus a game is a strict stable game if and only if the eigenvalues for S, except the
one corresponding to 1, are all negative.
Proposition 3.2. 〈x, PAPx〉 = 0 for all x ∈ Rl if and only if A ∈ N .
As is well-known, the Hawk-Dove game provides the simplest possible strictly
stable game, and from the equivalence we find
(z1, z2)
(
−1 1
1 −1
)(
z1
z2
)
= −(z1 − z2)2 < 0, for (z1, z2) 6= (0, 0).
This observation can be generalized via the basis of the subspace of anti-zero-sum
games N⊥ .
Corollary 3.3 (l−strategy strictly stable games). Suppose that
A ∈ {
∑
j>i
α(ij)K(ij) : α(ij) > 0}+ ker(Γ) +M⊥.
Then A is a strict stable game.
Proof. Recall that [A] is a strict stable game if 〈z, Az〉 < 0 for all z ∈ T∆ such that
z 6= 0.Let A ∈ S. Then we have 〈z, Az〉 = −∑j>i α(ij)(zi − zj)2 ≤ 0.Now suppose
that −∑j>i α(ij)(zi − zj)2 = 0. Then we have zi − zj = 0 for all j > i. Since z ∈ T∆,
this implies that z = 0.
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In case of three-strategy games, we can strengthen Corollary 3.3 so as to charac-
terize three-strategy strict stable games completely, since the computation in three-
strategy case is less demanding.
Corollary 3.4 (three-strategy strictly stable games). A three−strategy symmet-
ric game A is strictly stable if and only if
A ∈


−a− b a b
a −a− c c
b c −b− c
 : 4a+ b+ c > 0, ab+ bc+ ca > 0
+ker(Γ)+M
⊥.
First we note that when l = 3 in Corollary 3.3 the condition for strictly stable
games is a special case of Corollary 3.4 by the choices of a, b > 0 and c = 0. As
another important special case of Corollary 3.4, consider game B given by
B =
 0 β12 β13β12 0 β23
β13 β23 0
 .
First note that B is a potential game, so there is no anti-potential part of B. Thus
B can be decomposed into
B =
−a− b a ba −a− c c
b c −b− c
+ C︸︷︷︸
∈ ker(Γ)
and
a =
1
9
(5β12 − β13 − β23), b =
1
9
(−β12 + 5β13 − 2β23), c =
1
9
(−β12 − β13 + 5β23).
Then the conditions in Corollary 3.4 imply
β12 > 0 and (β12 + β23 + β13)
2 > 2(β212 + β
2
23 + β
2
13). (12)
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Recall that the generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors game can be decomposed as follows: 0 −l ww 0 −l
−l w 0
 ∼ 1
2
(w − l)
0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0
+ 1
2
(w + l)
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0
 .
We see that the case when β12 = β23 = β13, β12 > 0 satisfies conditions in (12),
so using Corollary 3.4 we conclude that the generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors game
is strictly stable if and only if w > l (See the discussion in (See the discussion in
Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2009)). In the next section we will provide another useful
parametrization of three-strategy anti-zero-sum games.
Next we characterize the bi-matrix stable games. First we recall that for J given
by
J :=
(
O A
BT O
)
,
the characteristic polynomial p(λ) = det(J − λI) satisfies p(λ) = (−1)lr+lcp(−λ).
Hence if λ is an eigenvalue, then −λ is also an eigenvalue. For a given bi-matrix game
(A,B), we can write (A,B) ∼ (V, V ) + (C,D) + (N,−N) where (C,D) ∈ ker(Γ).
Thus, P(A,B)P = P(V, V )P. So if (A,B) is a stable game, all its eigenvalues must
have the same sign and, thus, they must be all zeros. Hence every stable bi-matrix
game is always null-stable (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2009, Theorem2.1). Then, as
the similar argument as Proposition 3.1 shows, every null-stable bi-matrix game is a
zero-sum game. As a result, we provide the complete characterization of the set of
all stable bi-matrix games; the set of all stable bi-matrix games is the set of all zero-
sum games. Proposition 3.5 can be proved via either the straightforward extension
of Proposition 3.2 or the direct use of the basis of decompositions. We provide the
direct proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.5. 〈w,P(A,B)Pw〉 = 0 for all w ∈ Rlr+lc if and only if (A,B) ∈ N¯ .
3.2. Decomposition and Deterministic Dynamics
Evolutionary dynamics based on the normal form games have been extensively
examined and their important properties are closely related to the underlying games;
for example, potential games yield the gradient like replicator dynamics (Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998). Moreover the replicator dynamics are linear with respect to
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the underlying game matrix (or matrices), so our decompositions naturally induce
decompositions at the level of vector fields. We will consider the replicator dynamics
given by
One population: x˙i = xi((Ax)i − xTAx) for all i (13)
Two population: xi = xi((Ay)i − xTAy), y˙j = yj((BTx)j − yTBTx)
When we have A ∼ S+G+N, where S ∈ N⊥, G ∈ ker(Γ), N ∈M⊥, the replica-
tor dynamics can also be decomposed in three parts. First note that if G =
∑
i ηiE
(i)
η ,
then (Gx)i = ηi and 〈x,Gx〉 =
∑
l 6=1 ηlxl, so the vector field for the replicator dy-
namics induced by G is given by
xi(ηi −
∑
l 6=1
ηlxl)
and the system monotonically moves towards the dominating strategy state. Also
when xTNx = 0 for N ∈ M⊥. Thus, the replicator ordinary differential equation for
the matrix A can be decomposed into
fi(x) ∼ xi((Sx)i − xTSx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
potential part
+ xi(ηi −
∑
l 6=1
ηlxl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
monotonic part
+ xiNx︸ ︷︷ ︸
conservative part
This decomposition of the vector field of the replicator ordinary differential equations
coincides with the known Hodge decomposition which plays an important role in
understanding the underlying dynamics (See Abraham et al. (1988) and equation (1)
in Tong et al. (2003)).
We recall that a function H: D → R is an integral of (13) on a region D if H
is continuous differentiable and H(x(t)) is constant along the solution of (13);i.e.,
LH(x(t)) := 〈∇H(x(t)), f(x(t))〉 = 0 for a solution x(t). The orbits of a conservative
system must therefore lie on level curves of the integral H. A system (13) is said to be
conservative if it has an integral H. We again recall that a function V : D → R is a
strict Lyapunov function for C ⊂ D if V is continuous that achieves its minimum at
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C is non-increasing along the solutions and is decreasing outside of C; i.e., LV (x) :=
〈∇V (x), f(x))〉 ≤ 0 for x in D and LV (x) < 0 for x /∈ C.
It is well-known that the replicator dynamic for the Rock-Paper-Scissors games is
conservative and volume-preserving, the dynamics of the Matching Pennies games can
be transformed to Hamiltonian systems by change in velocity of solutions, and all the
bi-matrix games preserve volume up to change in velocity of solutions (Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998). As Proposition 3.6 shows, the class of anti-potential games provides
the dynamics which are volume-preserving without involving the change of time.
Proposition 3.6. (1) Suppose that [A] is an anti-potential game. Then (13) is con-
servative and volume-preserving.
(2) Suppose (A,B) ∈ range(Γ). Then (A,B) is conservative.
(3) Suppose that (A,B) is an anti-potential game and lc = lr. Then (A,B) is volume
preserving.
In the generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors game, it is easy to check that when b > a,
H(x) :=
∑
i log(xi) is a strict Lyapunov function for (
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
). Our decompositions
show that this observation generalizes to the bigger class of games that have the
similar structure to the generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors game.
Proposition 3.7. Suppose
A ∈ {
∑
j>i
α(ij)K : α(ij) > 0}+M⊥ .
Then, H(x) :=
∑
i log(xi) is a strict Lyapunov function for
1
n
1. And thus a unique
NE 1
n
1 is evolutionarily stable.
Proof. Let A = S + N, where S ∈ {∑j>i α(ij)K : α(ij) > 0} and N ∈ M⊥. Note
that for x 6= 1
n
1, we have
LH =
∑
i
((Ax)i − xTAx) =
∑
i
(Sx)i − 〈x, Sx〉+
∑
i
(Nx)i
= −〈x, Sx〉 = −〈x, PSPx〉 = −〈z, Sz〉 > 0
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Next we explain how to obtain the game which has a pure strategy ESS and an
interior asymptotically stable NE (called the Zeeman game) using the decomposition.
We consider a game A ∈ N⊥ ⊕M⊥. Then since A1 = 0, 1
n
1 is a Nash equilibrium.
From the previous discussion, the anti-zero-sum part S of A is completely determined
by its eigenvalues and (orthonormal) eigenvectors. Recall that S always has an eigen-
vector 1 with the corresponding eigenvalue 0 and other eigenvectors lie in the tangent
space. Thus when the number of strategies is three, any two eigenvectors in the tan-
gent space can be obtain by rotating given reference orthogonal eigenvectors around
the axis (1, 1, 1). First we denote the matrix for the Rock-Paper-Scissors game by N :
N :=
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0

Next, to express this parameterization of S we define the rotation matrix R which
rotates a given vector in R3 around the axis (1, 1, 1), as follows:
R = I − P + (cos θI + sin θ 1√
3
N)P. (14)
To explain the meaning of R, we first recall that the rotation matrix in R2 acts as
follows: (
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
)
x = cos θIx+ sin θ
(
0 −1
1 0
)
x.
Thus the rotation matrix map x to the linear combination of x itself and a vector
orthogonal to x, and the coefficients of the combination are parameterized by an
angle. Now note that 〈Nx, x〉 = 0 for all x. Thus when z ∈ T∆,
Rz = cos θIz + sin θ
1√
3
Nz
and since Nz is orthogonal to z, R acts in the same way as the rotation in two-
dimension. Also clearly R1 = 0. When x ∈ R3, x can be uniquely written as x =
(I − P )x + Px and R rotates the part belonging to range(P ). Thus, R has the
representation in (14). Using the rotation matrix R, we can write a three-strategy
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game A as follows:
A = R
 α +
β
3
−2β
3
−α + β
3
−2β
3
4β
3
−2β
3
−α + β
3
−2β
3
α + β
3
R−1 + η
 0 1 −1−1 0 1
1 −1 0
 ,
where
 α +
β
3
−2β
3
−α + β
3
−2β
3
4β
3
−2β
3
−α + β
3
−2β
3
α + β
3
 =
1 1 11 0 −2
1 −1 1

0 0 00 2α 0
0 0 2β

1 1 11 0 −2
1 −1 1

−1
Then the matrix A has the characteristic polynomial φ(t) = t(t2− 2(α+ β)t+ 4αβ +
3η2), so it has the eigenvalues 0, α + β ±√(α− β)2 − 3η2 and the eigenvector 1
corresponding to the eigenvalue 0. Note the eigenvalues for A do not depend on the
choice of θ. We can also verify this as follows. From RN = NR, we have
A = REDE−1R−1 + ηN = REDE−1R−1 + ηRNR−1 = R(EDE−1 + ηN)R−1,
where E denotes the matrix whose columns consist of orthogonal eigenvectors and
D denotes the diagonal matrix which has 0, 2α,and 2β on the diagonal. Since
R(EDE−1 + ηN)R−1 has the same eigenvalues as EDE−1 + ηN, eigenvalues of A
do not depend on the particular choice of θ.
Since ∂
∂xi
(xTAx) = (Ax)i + (A
Tx)i, by differentiating (13), we find that
∂fi(x)
∂xj
= xi(aij−(Ax)j−(ATx)j) for j 6= i, ∂fi(x)
∂xi
= ((Ax)i−xATx)+xi(aii−(Ax)i).
(15)
So if we evaluate the expressions in (15) at x = 1
n
1, from A1 = 0, AT1 = 0,and
(Ax)i − xATx = 0, we find the following Jacobian matrix
∂fi(x)
∂xj
∣∣∣∣
x= 1
n
1
=
1
n
aij.
Thus the eigenvalues for the linearized system around 1
n
1 are the same as the ones for
A up to a scalar multiple 1
n
. Also we note that if (α − β)2 < 3η2, then two non-zero
eigenvalues are complex and in this case real parts of eigenvalues are negative (zero,
positive, resp.) if and only if α + β < 0 (α + β = 0, α + β > 0,resp.). Now we set
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Figure 6: Rotation of Eigenvectors in the Zeeman Games. Figures are drawn using Dynamo:
W. H. Sandholm, E. Dokumaci, and F. Franchetti (2010). Dynamo: Diagrams for Evolutionary
Game Dynamics, version 0.2.5.
θ = 0. Then
A =
1
3
 3α + β −2β + 3η −3α + β − 3η−2β − 3η 4β −2β + 3η
−3α + β + 3η −2β − 3η 3α + β

so it is easy to see that if −(α + β) < η < 2α, then strategy 1 is a strict Nash
equilibrium, hence an evolutionary stable strategy. Thus we obtain the following
characterization of Zeeman games.
Proposition 3.8. Suppose that −(α + β) < η < 2α, and (α − β)2 < 3η2. Then
strategy 1 is an ESS and the interior fixed point is a sink (center, source, resp.) if
α + β < 0 (α + β = 0, α + β > 0,resp.).
In Figure 6 we show how the vector field of the system changes when θ varies. To
find a four-strategy Zeeman game we consider the following matrix using the similar
idea:
A =

1 1 1 1
1 0 0 −3
1 0 −2 1
1 −1 1 1


0 0 0 0
0 α 0 0
0 0 β 0
0 0 0 γ


1 1 1 1
1 0 0 −3
1 0 −2 1
1 −1 1 1

−1
+η

0 1 0 −1
−1 0 1 0
0 −1 0 1
1 0 −1 0

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Figure 7: 4-strategy Zeeman game. α : −2.5, β : −2.5, γ : 2, η : 1.9.
Then, it is easy to see that if −γ < η < γ and γ > 0, strategy 2 become a strict
Nash equilibrium, so an ESS. The characteristic polynomial for A is
φ(t) = t(t3 − (α + β + γ)t2 + (αβ + βγ + γα + 4η2)t− αβγ − 1
3
(6α + 2β + 4γ)η2).
Thus from the Routh-Hurwitz criterion(For example see Murray, 1989), we see that
eigenvalues λ for A all have negative real parts (except 0 eigenvalue) if and only if
α + β + γ < 0, αβ + βγ + γα + 4η2 > 0, 3αβγ + (6α + 2β + 4γ)η2 < 0,
αβγ +
1
3
(6α + 2β + 4γ)η2 > (α + β + γ)(αβ + βγ + γα + 4η2).
Using these conditions we exhibit a four-strategy Zeeman game in Figure 7.
4. Conclusion
We have developed several decomposition methods for two player normal form
games and discussed the extension to the general normal form games. Using decom-
positions, we characterize (1) the subspaces of potential games and their orthogonal
complements, anti-potential games, (2) the subspaces of zero-sum games and their
orthogonal complements, anti-zero-sum games, and (3) the subspaces of both poten-
tial and zero-sum games and their orthogonal complements. Notably, the subspaces
of anti-potential games consist of special games, the Rock-Paper-Scissors games in
the case of the symmetric games and the Matching Pennies games in the case of the
bi-matrix games. We have explained how the previous known criterion for the poten-
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tial games can be viewed from the perspective of decompositions and provided a new
cycle criterion for symmetric zero-sum games.
We have discussed the various applications of the decompositions, including (1)
the analysis of the generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors games, (2) the characterization
of the stable games, (3) the decomposition of the vector field and the construction of
Lyapunov functions in evolutionary dynamics, and so on. These decompositions turn
out to be useful in the analysis of the stochastic dynamics of the evolutionary games;
these applications will be discussed elsewhere.
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Appendix A. Appendix
Appendix A.1. Properties of inner products
First we observe that
1. (A,B)T = (B,A)
2. (A,B) is symmetric in L2 if A = B
3. (A,B) is anti-symmetric in L2 if A = −B
4. (A,B) is a symmetric game if lr = lc and A = B
T
So, a bi-matrix symmetric game is not necessarily a symmetric matrix in L2. We endow L2 with
an inner product <,>L2 defined by:
〈(A,B), (C,D)〉L2 := tr((A,B)T (C,D))
We provide some properties of 〈 〉L2 and 〈 〉L.
Lemma Appendix A.1. For (lr × lc) matrices A,B,C,D , we have
(1) 〈(A,B), (C,D)〉L2 = 〈A,C〉L + 〈B,D〉L
(2) 〈SA,B〉L = 〈A,SB〉L for a symmetric (lr × lr) matrix S
(3) 〈(A,A), (B,−B)〉L2 = 0
(4) For c ∈ Rlr and A such that A1lc = 0,
〈
A, c1Tlc
〉
L = 0.
(5) For c ∈ Rlc and A such that 1TlrA = 0,
〈
A,1lrc
T
〉
L = 0.
Proof. (1) and (2) are obvious. (3) follows from
〈(A,A), (B,−B)〉L2 = 〈A,B〉L − 〈A,B〉L = 0.
(4) follows from 〈
A, c1Tlc
〉
= tr(1lcc
TA) = tr(cTA1lc) = 0
by the commutativity of trace and (5) follows from〈
A,1lrc
T
〉
L
= tr(c1TlrA) = 0
Appendix A.2. Proof of Proposition 2.5
Proof. (1) We first show that
ker Γ = span{E(1)η , · · · , E(l)η , E(1)γ , · · · , E(l)γ }
Note that PE
(j)
γ = O for all j. Then E
(i)
η P = (P (E
(i)
η )T )T = O for all i. Thus we have span
{E(1)η , · · · , E(l)η , E(1)γ , · · · , E(l)γ } ⊂ ker Γ. Conversely, let A such that Γ(A) = O. Since
PAP = A− 1
l
11TA− 1
l
A11T +
1
l2
11TA11T ,
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we have
A =
1
l
11TA+
1
l
A11T − 1
l2
11TA11T
Then note the following properties of 11T :
11TA = (
∑
k
ak11 :
∑
k
ak21 : · · · :
∑
k
akl1)
i.e., the left action of 11T on A turns A into a matrix with the same elements in each column. Since
A11T = (11TAT )T , the right action of 11T on A turns A into a matrix with same elements in each
column. Also it is easy to see that 11TA11T =
∑
k
∑
m akm11
T . Thus A can be written as
A =
∑
i
(
∑
k
aki)E
(i)
γ +
∑
j
(
∑
k
ajk)E
(j)
η + (
∑
k
∑
m
akm)
∑
j
E(j)γ
So A ∈ span{E(1)η , · · · , E(l)η , E(1)γ , · · · , E(l)γ }. Thus ker Γ = span{E(1)η , · · · , E(l)η , E(1)γ , · · · , E(l)γ }. Next
note that ∑
i
E(i)η =
∑
j
E(j)γ , so E
(1)
γ = −
∑
j 6=1
E(j)γ −
∑
i
E(i)η ,
thus
span{E(1)η , · · · , E(l)η , E(1)γ , · · · , E(l)γ } = span{E(2)η , · · · , E(l)η , E(1)γ , · · · , E(l)γ }.
To show the linear independence among {E(2)η , · · · , E(l)η , E(1)γ , · · · , E(l)γ }, consider the linear combi-
nation of these matrices:
O =
∑
i 6=2
ηiE
(2)
η +
∑
j
γjE
(2)
j .
Then since E
(1)
η does not appear in the linear combination, we have γj = 0 for all j and this implies
ηi = 0 for i 6= 2.
(2) Note because of 1E
(ij)
κ = 0 and E
(ij)
κ 1 = 0,Γ(E
(ij)
κ ) = PE
(ij)
κ P = E
(ij)
κ . So,
E(ij)κ ⊂ range(Γ) for all i, j ≥ 2
and it is easy to see that E
(ij)
κ are linearly independent. Finally by
∣∣∣{E(ij)κ }ij∣∣∣ = (l − 1)2 and since
dim(range(Γ)) = (l − 1)2, {E(ij)κ }ij is a basis for range(Γ)
Appendix A.3. Proof of Proposition 2.6
Proof. First we show that ker(Γ) =M∩N . Observe that for i ≥ 2
(E(i)η + E
(i)
γ )
T = (E(i)η )
T + (E(i)γ )
T = E(i)γ + E
(i)
η
Thus (E
(i)
η +E
(i)
γ ) is symmetric and (E
(i)
η +E
(i)
γ )11 = 0, so E
(i)
η = (E
(i)
η +E
(i)
γ )T −E(i)γ ∈M. Also
(E(i)η − E(i)γ )T = (E(i)η )T − (E(i)γ )T = −(E(i)η − E(i)γ ),
so (E
(i)
η −E(i)γ ) is anti-symmetric and E(i)η = −(E(i)η −E(i)γ )T +E(i)γ ∈ N . Therefore ker Γ ⊂M∩N .
Conversely let A ∈M∩N . Then
A = S + 1cT1 and A = B + 1c
T
2 for a symmetric S and anti-symmetric B.
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Thus B + 1cT2 − 1cT1 = BT + c21T − c11T and using the anti-symmetry of B, we obtain
B =
1
2
(c21
T − c11T + 1cT2 − 1cT1 )
and so
A =
1
2
(c21
T − c11T + 1cT2 − 1cT1 ) + 1cT2 ∈ ker Γ.
Next we show that range(Γ) = span(M⊥ ∪N⊥). Then, we have
span(M⊥ ∪N⊥) = span({N (ij)}j>i≥2 ∪ {H(ij)}j>i≥2 ∪ {K(ii)}i≥2}
= span({K(ij)}j>i≥2 ∪ {K(ij)}i>j≥2 ∪ {K(ii)}i≥2}
= span({K(ij)}i≥2,j≥2} = range(Γ)
Appendix A.4. Proof of Lemma 2.13
Proof. First we show that span({[A(ij)+A(ji)]}i,j∈I1∩{j≥i}∪{[B(ij)−B(ji)]}i,j∈I2∩{j>i}∪{[C(i)]}i∈I3) =
K ∩ Lsym. Obviously,
[A(ij) +A(ji)] = (A(ij) +A(ji), (A(ij))T + (A(ji))T ) = (A(ij), A(ji)) + (A(ji), A(ij))
= (A(ij), A(ij)) + (A(ji), A(ji)) ∈ K ∩ Lsym
Similarly we have {(B(ij),−B(ij))}i,j ∈ K ∩ Lsym. Also [C(i)] = (C(i), (C(i))T ) = (C(i), O) +
(O, (C(i))T ) ∈ K ∩ Lsym. Conversely, let (E,F ) ∈ K ∩ Lsym. Then
(E,F )
=
∑
i,j∈I1
κ
(ij)
(1) (A
(ij), A(ij)) +
∑
i,j∈I2
κ
(ij)
(2) (B
(ij),−B(ij)) +
∑
i∈I3
κ
(i)
(3)(C
(i), O) +
∑
i∈I3
κ
(i)
(4)(O, (C
(i))T )
= (
∑
i,j∈I1
κ
(ij)
(1) A
(ij) +
∑
i,j∈I2
κ
(ij)
(2) B
(ij) +
∑
i∈I3
κ
(i)
(3)C
(i),
∑
i,j∈I1
κ
(ij)
(1) A
(ij) −
∑
i,j∈I2
κ
(ij)
(2) B
(ij) +
∑
i∈I3
κ
(i)
(4)(C
(i))T )
Since E = FT , we have∑
i,j∈I1
κ
(ij)
(1) A
(ij) +
∑
i,j∈I2
κ
(ij)
(2) B
(ij) +
∑
i∈I3
κ
(i)
(3)C
(i) =
∑
i,j∈I1
κ
(ij)
(1) A
(ji) −
∑
i,j∈I2
κ
(ij)
(2) B
(ji) +
∑
i∈I3
κ
(i)
(4)C
(i)
Thus we obtain∑
i,j∈I1
(κ
(ij)
(1) − κ(ji)(1) )A(ij) +
∑
i,j∈I2
(κ
(ij)
(2) + κ
(ji)
(2) )B
(ij) +
∑
i∈I3
(κ
(i)
(3) − κ(i)(4))C(i) = O (A.1)
Then from the linear independency of {A(ij)}ij ∪ {B(ij)}ij ∪ {C(i)}i in L, we conclude that
κ
(ij)
(1) = κ
(ji)
(1) , κ
(ij)
(2) = −κ(ji)(2) , and κ(i)(3) = κ(i)(4) for all i, j
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Note that κ
(ii)
(2) = 0 for all i. Thus we have∑
i,j∈I1
κ
(ij)
(1) (A
(ij), A(ij))
=
∑
{j>i}∩I1
κ
(ij)
(1) (A
(ij), A(ij)) +
∑
{j<i}∩I1
κ
(ij)
(1) (A
(ij), A(ij)) +
∑
{i=j}∩I1
κ
(ij)
(1) (A
(ij), A(ij))
=
∑
{j>i}∩I1
κ
(ij)
(1) (A
(ij), A(ij)) +
∑
{j>i}∩I1
κ
(ji)
(1) (A
(ji), A(ji)) +
∑
{(i,i)}∩I1
κ
(ii)
(1) (A
(ii), A(ii))
=
∑
{j>i}∩I1
κ
(ij)
(1) ((A
(ij) +A(ji), A(ij) +A(ji)) +
∑
{(i,i)}∩I1
1
2
κ
(ii)
(1) (A
(ii) +A(ii), A(ii) +A(ii))
=
∑
{j>i}∩I1
κ
(ij)
(1) ((A
(ij) +A(ji), A(ji) +A(ij)) +
∑
{(i,i)}∩I1
1
2
κ
(ii)
(1) (A
(ii) +A(ii), A(ii) +A(ii))
=
∑
{j>i}∩I1
κ
(ij)
(1)
[
A(ij) +A(ji)
]
+
∑
{(i,i)}∩I1
1
2
κ
(ii)
(1) [A
(ii) +A(ii)]
Similar manipulation yields∑
i,j∈I2
κ
(ij)
(2) (B
(ij),−B(ij))
=
∑
{j>i}∩I2
κ
(ij)
(2) (B
(ij),−B(ij)) +
∑
{j<i}∩I2
κ
(ij)
(2) (B
(ij),−B(ij))
=
∑
{j>i}∩I2
κ
(ij)
(2) (B
(ij),−B(ij)) +
∑
{j>i}∩I2
κ
(ji)
(2) (B
(ji),−B(ji))
=
∑
{j>i}∩I2
κ
(ij)
(2) ((B
(ij) −B(ji),−B(ij) +B(ji)) =
∑
{j>i}∩I2
κ
(ij)
(2) ((B
(ij) −B(ji), B(ji) −B(ij))
=
∑
{j>i}∩I2
κ
(ij)
(2)
[
B(ij) −B(ji)
]
and finally∑
i
κ
(i)
(3)(C
(i), O) +
∑
i
κ
(i)
(4)(O, (C
(i))T ) =
∑
i
κ
(i)
(3)(C
(i), (C(i))T ) =
∑
i
κ
(i)
(3)[C
(i)].
Therefore, we have span({[A(ij) + A(ji)]}i,j ∪ {[B(ij) − B(ji)]}i,j ∪ {[C(i)]}i) = K ∩ Lsym. Next we
show that {[A(ij) +A(ji)]}i,j ∪{[B(ij)−B(ji)]}i,j ∪{[C(i)]}i are linearly independent in L2. Suppose
that ∑
{j≥i}∩I1
αij [A
(ij) +A(ji)] +
∑
{j>i}∩I2
βij [B
(ij) −B(ji)] +
∑
I3
γi[C
(i)] = O in L2
Then we have∑
{j≥i}∩I1
αij(A
(ij) +A(ji)) +
∑
{j>i}∩I2
βij(B
(ij) −B(ji)) +
∑
I3
γi(C
(i)) = O in L
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and note that we have∑
{j≥i}∩I1
αij(A
(ij) +A(ji)) =
∑
{j>i}∩I1
αijA
(ij) +
∑
{i>j}∩I1
αjiA
(ij) +
∑
{i=j}∩I3
αiiA
(ii)
∑
{j>i}∩I2
βij(B
(ij) −B(ji)) =
∑
{j>i}∩I2
βijB
(ij) −
∑
{i>j}∩I2
βjiB
(ij)
and since
{
A(ij)
}
i,j
∪ {B(ij)}
i,j
∪ {C(i)}
i
are linearly independent in L, we conclude that αij =
0, βij = 0, and γi = 0 for all i, j.
Appendix A.5. Decomposition of n−player games
We will denote by S, S−p , and S−p∪q the set of all strategy profiles, the set of all strategy
profiles except player p,and the set of all strategy profiles except player p and q ; i.e.,
S : = {(ip1 , · · · , ipn) : ip1 , · · · , ipn ∈ S}
S−q : = {(ip1 , · · · , ıˆq, · · · , ipn) : ip1 , · · · , ipn ∈ S}
S−q∪r : = {(ip1 , · · · , ıˆq, · · · , ıˆr · · · , ipn) : ip1 , · · · , ipn ∈ S},
where ıˆq means that we omit the qth element. Then it is easy to see that |S−p| = ln−1. Also for
~i−q∪r ∈ S−q∪γ ,
(Ap1)~i−q∪r := (Ap1)(ip1 ,··· ,ˆıq,··· ,ˆır,··· ,ipn)
can be written as an l × l matrix and for ~i−q ∈ S−q, (Ap1)~i−q can be written as a l × 1 vector. We
also write
~i−q ⊂ ~j if (ip1 , · · · , k, · · · , ipn) = (jp1 , · · · , jq, · · · , jpn) for some k ∈ S
for ~i−q ∈ S−q and ~j ∈ S. To define passive games, we define a tensor E~i−qγ for ~i−q ∈ S−q as follows:
(E
~i−q
γ )~i−q = 1 and 0’s in other positions (A.2)
where 1 denotes a l × 1 vector consisting of 1’s. Then E~i−qγ in (A.2) is an tensor that describes the
payoffs of player q and under this payoffs, given other players’ strategy profile (i1, · · · , ıˆq, · · · , in) for
any choice of q player’s strategy, q obtains payoff 1. Then similarly we set
I = span({(E~i−p1γ , O, · · · , O)}~i−p1∈S−p1 , · · · , {(O, · · · , E
~i−pn
γ )}~i−pn∈S−pn )
where O denotes a ln− dimensional zero tensor. Then I is the set of all passive games. We also
define the following tensors: for ~i ∈ S,
(E
~i
β)~j = 1 if
~i = ~j .
Then E
~i
β is a tensor which has 1 at the position
~i and 0’s at others. Then similarly we set
M := span({(E~iβ , · · · , E~iβ)}~i∈S , I}. Then we obtain Proposition 2.15. Next, using Lemma 2.16, we
define the subspace of all zero-sum games:
N := span({(O, · · · , E~iβ︸︷︷︸
ith
, · · · ,−E~iβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
jth
, · · · , O)}(ip1 ,··· ,ipn )∈S,pi,pj∈P ∪ I).
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Then we have the following characterization for anti-zero-sum games. For the strategy profile ~i =
(ip1 , ip2 , · · · , ipn) such that ip ≥ 2 for all p,we define
(E
~i
κ)(ıˆp1 ,ˆıp2 ,1,···1) = E
(i1,i2)
κ , (E
~i
κ)(ıˆp1 ,ˆıp2 ,ip3 ,···1) = −E(i1,i2)κ , · · · ,
(E
~i
κ)(ıˆp1 ,ˆıp2 ,ip3 ,··· ,ipn ) = (−1)2n−1E(i1,i2)κ
and all other entries are zeros. An example of such tensors for 4 player 2 strategy is given by
E(2,2,2,2)κ =
(−1 1
1 −1
) (
1 −1
−1 1
)
(
1 −1
−1 1
) (−1 1
1 −1
) .
Then instead of Proposition 2.17, we will prove the following proposition.
Proposition Appendix A.2. {(E~iκ, · · ·E~iκ)}~i∈S, ip≥2 for all p form a basis for N⊥. Thus dim(N⊥) =
(l − 1)p
Proof. First since (E
~i
κ, · · ·E~iκ) is a symmetric tensor,
〈
(E
~i
κ, · · ·E~iκ), N
〉
Ln
= 0 for every exact
zero-sum game N. Also〈
(E
~i
κ, · · ·E~iκ), (O, · · · , E~i−qγ , · · ·O)
〉
Ln
=
〈
E
~i
κ, E
~i−q
γ
〉
L
= 0.
Thus span({(E~iκ, · · ·E~iκ)}~i∈S, ip≥2 for all p) ⊂N⊥.Now we showN⊥ ⊂ span ({(E
~i
κ, · · ·E~iκ)}~i∈S, ip≥2 for all p).
If (Ap1 , · · · , Apn) ∈ N⊥, then since all (O, · · · , Z, · · · ,−Z, · · · , O) ∈ N , (Ap1 , · · · , Apn) = (V, · · · , V ).
We now show how to express (V, · · · , V ) in terms of {(E~iκ, · · · , E~iκ)}~i∈S, ip≥2 for all p. To do this we
use an induction. We suppose that {(E~iκ, · · ·E~iκ)}~i∈S, ip≥2 for all p form a basis for the subspace of
anti-zero-sum games for n− 1 player games. Then for each ipn ∈ S such that ipn ≥ 2 (the strategy
of n th player), {(V )(ip1 ,ip2 ,··· ,ipn )}ip1 ,··· ,ipn−1∈S can be viewed as ln−1 dimensional tensor and hence
can be decomposed in terms of a basis of {(E~iκ, · · ·E~iκ)}~i∈S, ip≥2 for all p of n − 1 player games by
the induction hypothesis. In this way we obtain (l− 1)n−1 coefficients of the basis elements for each
ipn ≥ 2 and, thus, in total ( /l − 1)n coefficients. We write this linear combination as follows:
B =
∑
~i
κ
~iE
~i
κ
Then we have
(V )(ip1 ,ip2 ,··· ,ipn ) = (B)(ip1 ,ip2 ,··· ,ipn ) for ipn ≥ 2
by construction. Then it follows that (V )(ip1 ,ip2 ,··· ,1) = (B)(ip1 ,ip2 ,··· ,1) since
(V )(ip1,ip2,··· ,1) = −
∑
j≥2
(V )(ip1,ip2,··· ,j) = −
∑
j≥2
(B)(ip1,ip2,··· ,j) = (B)(ip1,ip2,··· ,1).
We illustrate the above proof by the following example. Suppose that p = 2 and l = 3. Suppose
that a symmetric bi-matrix game (A,A) is given; A = [a1 : a2 : a3]. Then we know that the basis
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for N⊥ is given by−1 1 01 −1 0
0 0 0
 ,
−1 1 00 0 0
1 −1 0
 ,
−1 0 11 0 −1
0 0 0
 ,
−1 0 10 0 0
1 0 −1
 .
If A ∈ N⊥ , A can be uniquely written as a linear combination of the above basis. On the other
hand, if A ∈ N⊥, then a2, a3 ∈ T∆, so a2, a3 can be uniquely written as a linear combination of
(1,−1, 0)T , (1, 0,−1)T . Clearly, the four coefficients that we obtain in the second way also are the
same as the coefficients of the basis elements of N⊥.
Appendix A.6. Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. ”If part” is obvious, so we let A ∈ L such that 〈x, PAPx〉 = 0 for all x ∈ Rl. From the
decomposition we can write A as the following:
A =
∑
j≥i≥2
κ(ij)(E(ij)κ + E
(ji)
κ ) +N + C, N ∈ (ML)⊥, C ∈ ker(Γ)
Since 〈x, PAPx〉 = 0 for all x ∈ Rl, we have∑
j≥i
κ(ij)
〈
x, (E(ij)κ + E
(ji)
κ )x
〉
= 0 for all x ∈ Rl.
Let K(ij) := 12 (E
(ij)
κ + E
(ji)
κ ). Next by choosing appropriate x, we show that κ(ij) = 0 for all j ≥ i.
Then it follows that A ∈ NL. To do this, observe that〈
x,K(ij)x
〉
= −x21 + x1xi + x1xj − xixj ,
so whenever x1 = xi or x1 = xj ,
〈
x,K(ij)x
〉
= 0.We first show that κ(ii) = 0 for all i. For a given
κ(mm), we choose
x = (1, 1, · · · , 1,mth0 , 1, · · · , 1)T
i.e., x is a vector that has 0 in nth element and 1 otherwise. Then all i < m, x1 = xi = 1, so〈
x,K(ij)x
〉
= 0. Similarly for all i > m, x1 = xi = 1, so
〈
x,K(ij)x
〉
= 0. When i = m, since j > i,
xj = x1 = 1, thus
〈
x,K(ij)x
〉
= 0. For i = j = m, xi = xj = 0 so
〈
x,K(mm)x
〉
= −1. Therefore
we have −κ(mm) = 0,which implies κ(mm) = 0. Next we show that κ(ij) = 0 for all i < j ≤ l using
induction. We start from the highest index, i.e., κ(l−1,l). For this case we set
x = (1, · · · , 1, l−1 th0 , 0)T .
where we assign an arbitrary value to xn. For all i < l − 1, x1 = xi = 1,
〈
x,K(ij)x
〉
= 0 and〈
x,K(l−1,l)x
〉
= −1, so κ(l−1,l) = 0. Next, we suppose that κ(ij) = 0 for all i > m and j > n and
show that κ(mn) = 0. In this case, we set
x = (1, · · · , 1,m th0 , 1 · · · , 1, n th0 , xn+1, · · · , xl)T .
where we assign arbitrary values to elements over nth position. Since n < l, x ∈ Rl. For all i < m,
xi = x1,
〈
x,K(ij)x
〉
= 0. When i = m and j < n, xj = 1, so again
〈
x,K(ij)x
〉
= 0. When i = m,
j = n, xi = xj = 0. Thus
〈
x,K(ij)x
〉
= −1 and we conclude κ(ij) = 0.
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Appendix A.7. Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proof. Again ”If part” is obvious, so we let (A,B) ∈ L2 such that 〈w,P(A,B)Pw〉 = 0 for all
w ∈ Rlr+lc . From corollary 2.7 (3), we can write (A,B) as
(A,B) =
∑
i≥2,j≥2
κ(ij)(E(ij)κ , E
(ij)
κ ) + (N,−N) + (C1, C2),
where (N,−N) ∈M⊥, (C1, C2) ∈ ker(Γ). Since 〈w,P(A,B)Pw〉 = 0 for all w ∈ Rlr+lc , we have∑
i≥2,j≥2
κ(ij)(
〈
y, (E(ij)κ )
Tx
〉
L
+
〈
x,E(ij)κ y
〉
L
) = 0 for all x ∈ Rlr , y ∈ Rlc .
Similarly to the previous section, by choosing appropriate x and y we show that κ(ij) = 0 for all
i ≥ 2, j ≥ 2. Then it follows that (A,B) ∈ N . To do this, observe that
1
2
(
〈
y,E(ji)κ x
〉
L
+
〈
x,E(ij)κ y
〉
L
) = −x1y1 + xiy1 + x1yj − xiyj , (A.3)
so whenever x1 = xi or y1 = yj ,(A.3) becomes zero. We choose the following (x
(i), y(j)):
x(i) = (1, 1, · · · , 1, ith0 , 1, · · · , 1)T , y(j) = (1, 1, · · · , 1,
jth
0 , 1, · · · , 1)T .
Then for (k,m) such that k 6= i or m 6= j, we have either x(i)1 = x(i)k or y(j)j = y(j)1 . Thus for all
(k,m) such that k 6= i or m 6= j,〈
y(j), E(mk)κ x
(i)
〉
L
+
〈
x(i), E(km)κ y
(j)
〉
L
= 0
and 〈
y(j), E(ji)κ x
(i)
〉
L
+
〈
x(i), E(ij)κ y
(j)
〉
L
= −2.
From this we conclude that κ(ij) = 0. Thus, (A,B) ∈ N .
Appendix A.8. Proof of Corollary 3.4
Proof. From proposition 3.1, we see that [A] is strictly stable if and only if S, A’s part belonging
to N⊥L , is strictly stable and S has the following parameterization.
S =
−a− b a ba −a− c c
b c −b− c

We recall that 〈x, Sx〉 satisfying ∑i xi = 0 is negative if and only if its bordered Hessians, given
below, satisfies some sign condition as we will check below. In our case, these conditions are
det
−a− b a 1a −a− c 1
1 1 0
 > 0, det

−a− b a b 1
a −a− c c 1
b c −b− c 1
1 1 1 0
 < 0.
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Then by computing determinants we find that
4a+ b+ c > 0 and ab+ bc+ ca > 0
and obtain the desired result.
Appendix A.9. Proof of Proposition 3.6
Proof. (1) First we note that xTAx = 0 and A1 = 0, so x0 = (
1
n , · · · , 1n ) is a rest point for (13).
We consider H(x) :=
∑
i log(xi). Then LH =
∑
(Ax)i = 0, thus H is an integral of (13). Thus (13)
is conservative. To show the preservation of volume we first write xˆ = (1−∑i 6=1 xi, x2, · · · , xn) and
when x ∈ ∆, Ax = Axˆ and 〈x,Ax〉 = 〈xˆ, Axˆ〉 . Also we note that for k ≥ 2,
∂
∂xk
(Axˆ)k = −ak1 + akk
∂
∂xk
〈xˆ, Axˆ〉 = −(Ax)1 − (ATx)1 + (ATx)k + (Ax)k
Thus
div∆ fA =
∑
k 6=1
∂fk
∂xk
(x) =
∑
k 6=1
(Ax)k − (l − 1) 〈x,Ax〉 −
∑
k 6=1
xkak1 +
∑
k 6=1
xkakk
+(1− x1)(Ax)1 + (1− x1)(ATx)1 −
∑
k 6=1
xk(A
Tx)k −
∑
k 6=1
xk(Ax)k
=
∑
k
(Ax)k − l 〈x,Ax〉+
∑
k
xkakk −
〈
x,ATx
〉
If A is anti-potential, then
∑
k(Ax)k = 〈1, Ax〉 =
〈
AT1, x
〉
= 0 and all diagonal elements of A are
zero. Thus div∆ fA = 0
(2) Recall that (A,B) ∈ range(Γ) if and only if (1Tr A,1Tr B) = 0 and (A1c, B1c) = 0.Thus (A,B)
has an interior rest point, so from Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) (p.130) the result follows.
(3) Similarly we have, for lr =: l ≥ 2
∂
∂xl
〈xˆ, Ay〉 = (Ay)l − (Ay)1, and ∂
∂yl
〈
yˆ, BTx
〉
= (BTx)l − (BTx)1.
Thus
div∆ f(A,B) =
∑
i 6=1
∂fi
∂xi
(x, y) +
∑
j 6=1
∂fj
∂yj
(x, y) =
∑
i 6=1
((Ay)i − 〈x,Ay〉)−
∑
i 6=1
xi((Ay)i − (Ay)1)
+
∑
j 6=1
((BTx)i −
〈
y,BTx
〉
)−
∑
j 6=1
yj((B
Tx)j − (BTx)1)
=
∑
i
(Ay)i − lr 〈x,Ay〉+
∑
j
(BTx)j − lc
〈
y,BTx
〉
.
Then since (A,B) is anti-symmetric in L2, which implies 〈x,Ay〉 + 〈y,BTx〉 = 0,and (A,B) ∈
range(Γ), the result follows.
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